

THE MOLECULE OF EXPERIENCE

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Way back in 1874 Brentano made the point that "*psychology from an empirical viewpoint makes it clear that objects of external perception really exist as they do to us. Indeed they do not exist outside of us and in contrast to that which really and truly does exist they are mere phenomena.*"

Space syntax, semiotics, geographers and psychologists have all attempted to "explain" person/environment phenomena. All of these (now) agree that the 'individual in space' produces a unique (to them i.e. hedonistic) image or model of their environment.

The perfect solution to understanding person/environment phenomena would be to merge the individual's map together with stereotypical mapping however the way of doing this can be neither wholly individual nor wholly spatial. In a philosophical sense the games played using the rules have to be social and have a membership of sorts.

Developmental Syntax has evolved over the past four years to produce a methodology capable of building units of experiential space. These units reflect Brentano's understanding of the phenomenon, that they are neither spatial nor biological (i.e. real) and acquire their reality through experience.

DS maps experience, rather than purely functional space. It allows for the combination of building blocks of experience which can be selected for as social phenomena. These 'molecules' of selected experiences become ways of occupying a building, street or town and combine both occupants and buildings - as rule based affiliations and allocations are copied or selected for over other less useful/available relationships.

The concept of these copied elements being phenomena rather than real elements of space or human behaviour as biology can be categorized as memetic - after the introduction of memes in the latter part of the 20th Century. The paper demonstrates the concept of Developmental Syntax as a memetic phenomenon.