

MODULE TITLE: Cultural Context of Architecture VI

MODULE CODE: ARC 711B1

HAND OUT No: 27

Essential Reading: -

Dreyfus H L, Being in the World, Cambridge Massachusetts and London England, MIT Press, 1997

Gadamer H G, The Beginning of Knowledge, New York; London, Continuum, 2003

Schrag C O, The Resources of Rationality, Indiana, Indiana University Press, 1992

Bickerton D, Language and Human Behaviour, University College Press, 1996

Dwelling

Possibly more appropriately - Wisdom

Keyword dwelling currently delivers the philosopher Martin Heidegger

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dwelling>

discussions about what Heidegger may or may not have meant are as common as arguments about what phenomenology may or may not BE and one person in the states is a particular pain the ass about such things

<http://www.arch.ksu.edu/seamon/Heidegger.htm>

using what is most usually referred to as ethnomethodological approaches to phenomenology which are to be understood as attention to every little detail of space in order to appreciate the most exact understanding of an understanding based on space – which to me shows the insufficiency

<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/insufficiency%20>

of using space without time as an indication of dwelling in that sense of being at home in a space.

For a start off Heidegger was talking about humanity and NOT about individuals – see the reference above – Dreyfus has taught Heidegger as a subject for over twenty years so is a good read about Heidegger

BUT we do not want to get caught up in arguments about the interpretation of Heidegger's text since we are not philosophers but architects and environmentalists!

In the book by Gadamer H G, [The Beginning of Knowledge, New York; London, Continuum, 2003] he gives a useful insight into Heidegger's thoughts about the changes brought upon humanity by the Greek search for correctness or truth. This is the same sort of question posed by Schrag in Schrag C O, The Resources of Rationality, Indiana, Indiana University Press, 1992 as he asks if the correct form of integration isn't more like Gadamer's horizons that are not spatial but representational.

When we add Bickerton's linguistic work to the mix we find that the basic human condition is a representational [individual] relationship to both genetic and cultural influences (cultural being over generations rather than immediately social – thus cultural gives rise to temporal considerations, genetic being the neural organization of homo sapiens sapiens).

The upshot of this is that the individual must first transpose individual understanding to social understanding and in this it seems inevitable that specific **declarative and procedural units of space and time** must become state-of-the-art. It follows that other individual will have different state of the art **declarative and procedural units of space and time** or else they will conform to those that most appeal to them as individuals. These **declarative and procedural units of space and time** will be representational to neural organization and reality and it is possible to see complex debates occurring

as accommodation and assimilation increase within a constitution [see Piaget for comment on such constructs - Piaget J, (1968), Structuralism, London, Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1971].

The tool of truth, the reason that is claimed to be the foundation of establishing spatial fundamentalism, depends, as we see in handout 26 upon the inductive or deductive comments of one doubting individual which in the Kantian model is delivered up by a transcendental relationship between observation and reality as observed. This doubt is now being applied not as doubt but as transcendental truth on the basis that remaining in doubt leaves an impossible relativity with no consensus. The shift to instrumental and spatial certainty is both obvious but also daft unless the Kantian model is claimed as correct.

Ultimately then the architectural question concerning global truth, be this sustainability for example or common forms of best practice, rely upon some kind of Kantian model of eventual transcendence of individuality to commonality (the capitalist to communist drift predicted by Marx – who by the way believed in science and was pre Lacan and semiology) so that the entire world has a value system of global proportions – that is to say not the fact of it but the belief in it. Alternatively we may rely on a Lacanian model that is to say that a global model is not possible since the temporal relationships that occur will not allow any global spatial relationships to become transcendental.

Ultimately it seems that we must choose between a spatial model that is specified by a shared construct or a social model of interpretations that acquire shape as manifestations of expression. On closer inspection we can interpret both of these as the same thing but with claims for the construct as being transcendental or of human origin. Thus the basic question remains that of human belief in its dwelling in the world, which is Heidegger's issue is it not?

Do we dwell as fabricators of our own condition or do we dwell by courtesy of some transcendental other? The four areas of fabrication, if we call them that, shift from the excitement of existence or simply an immersion in chaos, to the transitional social interactions that form constructs using the concept of language as tool (rather than language as being), to constructs that allow normative relationships and cultural hegemony to take place as a control seemingly by 'other' that is actually by the shared construct we made earlier, and finally the shift to hubris or fundamental belief in the construct as transcendental and reified relationships to sacred and profane. Thus the Lacanian model can subsume the Kantian model, which seems to give the Lacanian model the upper hand?

With reference to silo mentalities raised in handout 26 we may wonder if these are not the normative constructs and quite definitely constructs in the area of fabrication we have called hubris. The construct making in the transitional social stages and the excitement or simply immersion in the world without making use of constructs already fabricated will depend for its existence upon the value given to such activities by any overall economy, which is an economy of BEING rather than one of knowledge, since knowledge is specifically the normative and transcendental forms of construct.

This may well be understood as the problem of narcissism or of falling in love with an image, construct, rather than fulfilling the condition of wisdom that is possible in the transitional and excitement stages but not in the normal stages without distancing from the normal and rejection of the obtuse. Hence globalisation is unlikely to work except as a concept – the reality will produce difference in what is understood by it.